Cycles of attacking arguments pose non-trivial issues in Dung style argumentation theory, apparent behavioural difference between odd and even length cycles being a notable one. While a few methods were proposed for treating them, toin particular -enable selection of acceptable arguments in an odd-length cycle when Dung semantics could select none, so far the issues have been observed from a purely argumentgraph-theoretic perspective. Per contra, we consider argument graphs together with a certain lattice like semantic structure over arguments e.g. ontology. As we show, the semanticargumentgraphic hybrid theory allows us to apply abstract interpretation, a widely known methodology in static program analysis, to formal argumentation. With this, even where no arguments in a cycle could be selected sensibly, we could say more about arguments acceptability of an argument framework that contains it. In a certain sense, we can 'verify' Dung extensions with respect to a semantic structure in this hybrid theory, to consolidate our confidence in their suitability. By defining the theory, and by making comparisons to existing approaches, we ultimately discover that whether Dung semantics, or an alternative semantics such as cf2, is adequate or problematic depends not just on an argument graph but also on the semantic relation among the arguments in the graph.
Introduction
Consider the following scenario: the members of a board of directors are gathered in a meeting to decide the future general strategy of their company.
• a 1 : "We should focus on improving our business organization structure, because it determines our economic conduct." (focusOnOs and OsDeterminesEc, to shorten) is advanced by one member.
• a 2 : "We should focus on improving our market performance, because it determines our business organization structure." (focusOnMp and MpDeterminesOs) is then advanced by another member, as an attack on a 1 . • a 3 : "We should focus on improving our economic conduct, because it determines our market performance." (focusOnEc and EcDeterminesMp), is then given in response to a 2 .
• The first member attacks a 3 , however, with a 1 , to an inconclusive argumentation.
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• a 5 : "Our firm needs 1 billion dollars revenue this fiscal year.", meanwhile, is an argument expressed by another member.
• a 4 : "Let our company just sink into bankruptcy!" (focusOnLiq), another member impatiently declares in response, against which, however, all the first three speakers promptly express dissent with their arguments.
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We can represent this argumentation as AF 1 of Figure A . In Dung's abstract argumentation theory (Dung 1995) , an admissible set of arguments is such that (1) no argument in the set is attacking an argument of the same set and (2) each argument attacking an argument in the set is attacked back by some argument in the set. Clearly, there is no non-empty admissible set in AF 1 . With labelling (Caminada 2006 ) (an argument is in if all its attackers are out, is out if there exists an attacker that is in, and is undecided, otherwise), every argument is labelled undecided, and so we gain almost no information on the acceptability of the arguments.
However, notice that a 1 , a 2 and a 3 are arguments for the benefit of their company's growth. So, by aggregating them into a new argument a x : "We should focus on our company's further growth" (focusOnImp), and by thus deriving the framework as in Figure B , we could obtain some more useful information on the acceptability of arguments, namely, that a x is in, a 4 is out, and a 5 is in. Hence we have sharpened acceptability statuses of a 4 and, in particular, a 5 of AF 1 .
to say something about the former space. The abstract semantics is typically coarser than the concrete semantics; in our example, the detail of what exactly their company should focus on was abstracted away. In return, we were able to conclude that a x is in and, moreover, that a 4 is out. Compared to existing approaches to deal with cycles e.g. (Baroni, Giacomin, and Guida 2005) , which gives in state to a 5 by enforcing acceptance of either of a 1 , a 2 and a 3 to reject a 4 , this approach that we propose does not require one to accept any of the arguments within the cycle, even provisionally, in order to be able to reject a 4 , and thus accept a 5 . By abstracting away some or all of the cyclic arguments, we avoid having to accept any of them while rejecting others.
In general, abstract interpretation is applicable to cycles of any length. There can be more than one way of interpreting an argumentation framework abstractly, however, and the key for obtaining a good outcome is to find properties sufficiently fine for abstraction. For the attacks among a 1 , a 2 , a 3 and a 4 in AF 1 , we observe that, specifically: a 1 's focusOnOs, a 3 's focusOnEc, and a 2 's focusOnMp attacks a 4 's focusOnLiq; and a 1 's focusOnOs a 3 's focusOnEc and a 2 's focusOnEc form a cycle of attacks. For these, the semantic information fine enough to abstract a 1 , a 2 , a 3 into a x is shown below (only focusOnX expressions are explicitly stated here). In this Figure C: AF and some ontological abstract-concrete relation over its arguments. focusOnImp is more abstract an argument than focusOnOs, focusOnMp, and focusOnEc. Neither of the three is more abstract or more concrete than the other two. focusOnLiq is not a concrete instance of focusOnImp.
figure, a x (focusOnImp: focus on further growth), sits as more abstract an argument of a 1 , a 2 and a 3 . While there may be other alternatives for abstracting them, focusOnImp belongs to a class of good abstractions, as it satisfies the property that the three arguments but not focusOnLiq fall into it, which gives justification as to why the attack relation in the initial argumentation framework is expected to preserve in the abstractly interpreted argumentation framework (from a x to a 4 ). This is what we might describe the condition of attack-preservation. Further, the three concrete arguments exhibit a kind of competition for the objective: their company's business focus. While "organisation structure", "market performance", and "economic conduct" all vie for it and in that sense they indeed oppose, neither of them actually contradicts the objective, which is why abstraction of the three arguments is possible here.
We will formulate abstract interpretation for argumentation frameworks, the first study of the kind, as far as we are aware. We will go through technical preliminaries (in Section 2), and develop our formal frameworks and make comparisons to Dung preferred and cf2 semantics (in Section 3), before drawing conclusions. The discovery we ultimately make is that whether Dung preferred or cf2 semantics is adequate or problematic depends not only on the argumentation framework's structure, but also on the semantic relation between its arguments. We will show that our methodology is one viable way of enhancing accuracy in judgement as to which set of arguments should be accepted.
Technical preliminaries Abstract argumentation
Let A be a class of abstract entities. An argumentation framework according to Dung's argumentation theory is a 2-tuple (A, R) for A ⊆ fin A and R : A × A. Let a with a subscript refer to a member of A, and let A with or without a subscript refer to a subset of A. An argument a 1 is said to attack another argument a 2 if and only if, or iff, (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R. A subset A 1 is said to accept, synonymously to defend, a x iff, for each a y attacking a x , it is possible to find some a z ∈ A 1 such that a z attacks a x . A subset A 1 is said to be: conflict-free iff no element of A 1 attacks an element of A 1 ; an admissible set iff it is conflict-free and defends all the elements of A 1 ; and a preferred set (extension) iff it is a set-theoretically maximal admissible set. There are other classifications to admissibility, and an interested reader will find details in (Dung 1995 ). An argument is skeptically accepted iff it is in all preferred sets and credulously accepted iff it is in at least one preferred set.
Order and Galois connection for abstract interpretation
Let L 1 and L 2 (each) be an ordered set, ordered in 1 and 2 respectively. Let α be an abstraction function that maps each element of L 1 onto an element of L 2 , and let γ be a concretisation function that maps each element of L 2 onto an element of L 1 . α(l 1 ) for l 1 ∈ L 1 is said to be an abstraction of l 1 in L 2 , and γ(l 2 ) for l 2 ∈ L 2 is said to be a concretisation of l 2 in L 1 . If α(l 1 ) 2 l 2 implies l 1 1 γ(l 2 ) and vice versa for every l 1 ∈ L 1 and every l 2 ∈ L 2 , then the pair of α and γ is said to be a Galois connection. Galois connection is contractive: α • γ(l 2 ) 2 l 2 for every l 2 ∈ L 2 , and extensive: l 1 1 γ • α(l 1 ) for every l 1 ∈ L 1 . Also, both α and γ are monotone with α
An ordered set L 1 , ordered by a partial order 1 , is a complete lattice just when it is closed under join and meet for every L 1 ⊆ L 1 . Every finite lattice is a complete lattice.
Argumentation frameworks for abstraction
While, for our purpose, Dung's theory is not expressive enough, all we have to do is to detail the components of the tuple so that we gain access to some internal information of each argument.
Lattices
Let (L 2 , , , ) be a finite lattice. Let E be the class of expressions as abstract entities. We denote each element of E by e with or without a subscript and a superscript. Those focusOnMP and others in our earlier example are expressions. Let f : E → L 2 be a function that maps an expression onto an element in the lattice. This function is basically a semantic interpretation of E, which could be some chosen ontology representation with annotations of generalspecific relation among entities. For example, in Introduction, focusOnImp was more general than focusOnMp, focusOnEc and focusOnOs, which should enforce focusOnImp mapped onto an upper part in L 2 than the three, i.e. f (focusOnEc), f (focusOnMp), f (focusOnOs) f (focusOnImp). In the rest, rather than L 2 itself, we will talk of the sub-complete-lattice L 2 of all f (e) for e ∈ E as well as its top and its bottom.
E form abstract space arguments with the relation as defined in L 2 . Concrete space arguments, in comparison, are just a set of expressions that can possibly be arguments. Let low : L 2 → 2 L2 be such that:
We let (L 1 , ⊆ , , ) be another complete lattice where L 1 := 2 E and ⊆ satisfies:
• x ⊆ y and y ⊆ x iff: x = {e 1 , . . . , e n } and y ={e 1 , . . . , e i−1 , e 1 , . . . , e m , e i+1 , . . . , e n } with low(f (e i )) = {e 1 , . . . , e m }. The lattices shown in Figure D illustrate the second condition. Notice that low(f (focusOnImp)) = {f (focusOnMp), f (focusOnEc), f (focusOnOs)} in L 2 . {focusOnImp} and {focusOnMp, focusOnEc, focusOnOs} are equivalent in L 1 which is indeed a quotient lattice. This equivalence reflects the following interpretation of ours of expressions. Any expression e 1 has concrete instances e 2 , . . . , e i if f (e 2 ), . . . , f (e i ) are children of f (e 1 ) in abstract lattice. If, here, f (e 2 ), . . . , f (e i ) are all the children of f (e 1 ), our interpretation is that mentioning f (e 1 ) is just a short-hand of mentioning all f (e 2 ), . . . , f (e i ), i.e. both mean the same thing with respect to the structure of L 2 . It is because of this that we place all equivalent sets of expressions at the same node in L 1 .
Argumentation frameworks
We call an expression with an ID -which we just take from A -an argument-let, so the class of all argument-lets is
To readers interested in knowing compatibility with Dung's argumentation frameworks, Dung's argument corresponds to a set of all argument-lets in A b that share the same ID. For example, we may have A b = {(a 1 , e 1 ), (a 1 , e 2 ), (a 1 , e 3 ), (a 2 , e 1 ), (a 2 , e 4 )}, in which case A b maps into A = {a 1 , a 2 } if projected into Dung's argumentation framework. For compatibility of attack relation, too, Dung's (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R, i.e. a 1 attacks a 2 , (assuming that both a 1 and a 2 are in A) corresponds to ((a 1 , e 1 ), (a 2 , e 2 )) ∈ R b for some e 1 and some e 2 (assuming both (a 1 , e 1 ) and (a 2 , e 2 ) are in A b ). For convenience hereafter, by argument a with or without a subscript, we refer to a set of argument-lets in A b that share the ID a. We do not consider any more structured arguments than a finite subset of A b in this work; further structuring, while of interest, is not the main focus, which is left to a future work. All notations around extensions: conflict-freeness, acceptance and defence, admissible and preferred sets, are carried over here for arguments (note, not for argument-lets).
Abstraction and concretisation
Now, let α : L 1 → L 2 be the abstraction function, and let γ : L 2 → L 1 be the concretisation function. We require: α(l 1 ) = eu∈l1 f (e u ); and γ(l 2 ) = {x ∈ E | f (x) ∈ low(l 2 )}. Intuition is as we described earlier in 3.1. Note γ(l 2 ) is an empty set when low(l 2 ) does not contain any f (e) for e ∈ E. We say that e x is the best abstraction of {e 1 , . . . , e n } iff f (e x ) = α({e 1 , . . . , e n }), but more generally we say that e x is an abstraction of e 1 , . . . , e n iff α({e 1 , . . . , e n })
f (e x ). We say that {e 1 , . . . , e n } is the most general concretisation of e x iff {e 1 , . . . , e n } = γ(f (e x )). More generally, we say that {e 1 , . . . , e n } is a concretisation of e x iff {e 1 , . . . , e n } ⊆ γ(f (e x )).
by definition of α. is a standard abbreviation. Then we have γ(l 2 ) ⊂ l 1 , contradiction. Suppose l 2 and α(l 1 ) are not comparable in , then clearly l 1 ⊆ γ(l 2 ), contradiction. Only if: Suppose γ(l 2 ) ⊂ l 1 , then there exists at least one e in l 1 which is not in any set equivalent to γ(l 2 ) under ⊆ . Then by definition of α, we have l 2 α(l 1 ), contradiction.
Example 1 In Figure D , low(f (focusOnImp)) = {focusOnMp, focusOnEc, focusOnOs}. We see that, for instance, {focusOnMp, focusOnEc} is mapped to
Let E ⊆ E with or without a subscript denote a set of expressions. Each argument-let comes with a singleton set of expression, so an argument comes with a set of expressions. When we write E ax , we mean to refer to all expressions associated with a x . For abstraction, we say that an argument a x is:
abstraction-covering for a set of arguments a 1 , . . . , a n iff, if e x ∈ E ax is an abstraction of E ⊆ {E a1 , . . . , E an }, then it is an abstraction of 1≤i≤n E ai where E ai is a non-empty subset of E ai . abstraction-disjoint for a set of arguments a 1 , . . . , a n iff, for each a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if e k ∈ E ax is an abstraction of e u ∈ E ai , then e j ∈ E ax , j = k, is not e u 's abstraction.
abstraction-sound for a set of arguments a 1 , . . . , a n iff, for each a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is no e ∈ E ai that is not abstracted by any e ∈ E ax . abstraction-complete for a set of arguments a 1 , . . . , a n iff, for each e ∈ a x , e is an abstraction of E ⊆ Figure E illustrates these 4 conditions. a x comes with {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 }, a 1 with {e 1 , e 2 }, and a 2 with {e 3 , e 4 }. In [A], a x is abstraction-covering for {a 1 , a 2 } because e 1 ∈ E ax abstracts from a non-empty subset of both E a1 and E a2 . If e 1 should abstract only from a non-empty subset of E a1 but not of E a2 , abstraction-covering-ness would not be satisfied.
In [B] , a x satisfies abstraction-disjointness because any expression is abstracted at most by one expression in E ax . If, here, e 1 should abstract both from e 1 and e 2 , this condition would fail to hold. In [C] , a x satisfies abstraction-soundness because all expressions in E a1 ∪ E a2 are abstracted. If there should be even one expression in E a1 ∪ E a2 that is not abstracted, this condition would fail to hold. In [D] , a x satisfies abstraction-completeness because each expression in E ax abstracts expressions in E a1 ∪ E a2 . If there should be even one expression in E ax that does not abstract any expressions in E a1 ∪ E a2 , this condition would fail to hold. Proposition 2 (Independence) Let ω, β be one of the propositions {a x is abstraction-covering, a x is abstraction-sound, a x is abstraction-disjoint, a x is abstraction-complete}. Then ω materially implies β iff ω = β.
As for motivation of the four conditions, our goal for abstraction of a given set A of arguments dictates that, in whatever manner we may abstract, eventually we abstract from all expressions of all the arguments in A. Hence we have abstraction-soundness. However, consider an extreme case where each e i abstracts from a single argument a 1 . Then, certainly, such abstraction weakens each member of A, but there is no guarantee that the weakening is a weakening of A, because abstraction of {e 1 , . . . , e n } is necessarily abstraction of each of e 1 , . . . , e n , but abstraction of e 1 is not necessarily that of {e 1 , . . . , e n }. Not abstracting from each and every a 1 ∈ A is problematic for this reason. Abstraction-covering-ness is therefore desired. Abstraction-disjointness discourages redundancy in abstraction. Abstraction-completeness ensures relevance of abstraction to a given set of arguments to be abstracted. In the rest, whenever we state a u is an abstraction of {a 1 , . . . , a n }, a u will be assumed to be abstraction-covering, abstractiondisjoint, abstraction-sound and abstraction-complete for them. We say that the abstraction is the best abstraction iff it is the best abstraction of all expressions associated with {a 1 , . . . , a n }.
Proposition 3 If a x is the best abstraction of a set A of arguments, then every abstraction of A is an abstraction of a x .
Proposition 4 (Existence) There exists at least one abstraction for every set of arguments.
Proof L 2 is a complete lattice.
However, some abstraction, including the top element of L 2 if it is in {f (e) ∈ L 2 | e ∈ E}, can be so general that all arguments are abstracted by it. In the first example in Introduction, "Argumentation is taking place." could be such an argument, in which one may not be normally interested for reasoning about argumentation: the whole point of argumentation theory is for us to be able to judge which set(s) of arguments may be acceptable when the others are unacceptable, so we should not trivialise a given argumentation by a big summary argument.
Conditions for conservative abstraction Hence, a few conditions ought to be defined in order to ensure conservative abstraction. Assume an argumentation framework (A b , R b ). We assume that those elements of L 2 that are so abstract that they could abstract all argument-lets in A b into a single argument-let are forming a non-empty upper set M of L 2 : M (⊆ L 2 ) is an upper set iff, if x ∈ M and x y, then y ∈ M . Intuition is that once we find some f (e) in L 2 that is so general, then any f (e 1 ) such that f (e) f (e 1 ) is also. For example, if f (focusOnImp) in L 2 is so general, then f ("Argumentation is taking place.") is also so general.
Let us say that there is a path from an argument a 1 to an argument a 2 iff either a 1 attacks a 2 , or else there is a path from a 1 to some argument a 3 which attacks a 2 . Let us say that a set A 1 of arguments is strongly connected component in (A b , R b ) iff (1) there is a path from any a 1 ∈ A 1 to any a 2 ∈ A 1 and (2) there exists no
, we define that abstraction a x of a set A 1 of arguments is: valid iff there exists a strongly connected component A s ⊆ A b such that: (1) A 1 ⊆ A s ; and (2) there exists no A 1 ⊂ A 2 ⊂ A s such that a x is an abstraction of A 2 (abstraction is over as many members of a strongly connected component as possible); non-trivial iff α(E ax ) ∈ M (abstraction cannot be too general); and compatible iff: there exist no argument-lets (a 1 , e 1 ), (a 2 , e 2 ) ∈ A that satisfy both (1) ((a 1 , e 1 ), (a 2 , e 2 ) ) ∈ R b and (2) f (e 1 ) and f (e 2 ) are comparable in (abstraction cannot be over arguments that contain an attack from more abstract an argument on more concrete an argument or vice versa).
What compatibility expresses is: a pair of arguments a 1 and a 2 with an attack between them is not suited for abstraction if a 1 (or a 2 ) is more, if not equally, abstract than a 2 (or a 1 ). For justification, suppose firstly that a 2 is a 1 . Then it is a self-attack. Let us suppose that abstraction of a 1 and a 2 is feasible, then we can get rid of all self-attacks by means of abstraction. But that would render all such selfattacks not playing any role in argumentation, which cannot be the case (Baumann et al. 2017) . In a more general setting where a 2 is not a 1 , if it is a 1 that attacks a 2 , given that a 2 is more concrete an argument of a 1 , the attack is again a type of self-attack. Still, it is not safe to compile away the attack by taking abstraction of a 1 and a 2 , because the abstraction is more, if not equally, abstract than a 1 which a 2 was attacking. The second condition of validity is motivated in a way by compatibility.
1 Let us consider the example in Introduction again (a part of it is re-listed in Figure F and α(E a3 ) are not comparable in (Cf. Figure D) . The least upper bound of any two among the three, by the way, is the same element in L 2 . Hence, by taking abstraction of only two among them, say a 1 and a 2 , we obtain an abstract space argumentation framework as in the right figure of Figure F. As the attacks between a y and a 3 are both of abstractconcrete and of concrete-abstract, the compatibility condition prevents any further abstraction on this argumentation framework. This, however, is amiss, because such abstractconcrete (concrete-abstract) relation among the participants of the cycle were not present (they were not comparable in ) in the original argumentation framework. The validity condition precludes this anomaly. Proposition 5 (Independence) Let ω, β be one of the propositions: {a x is valid, a x is non-trivial, a x is compatible}. ω materially implies β iff ω = β.
These are conditions that apply for abstraction of a given set of arguments alone. In an argumentation framework, however, we also consider attacks between a set of arguments and the arguments that are not in the set. We say that abstraction a x of a set A 1 of arguments is attack-preserving iff, for each a b ∈ A b \A 1 and each a
) are not comparable in (abstraction of a x and external attackers/attackees shall not be in abstract-concrete (concreteabstract) relation). For intuition behind this condition, let us consider Figure G . For simplicity, let us assume that E ai ,
L2
Figure G: Left: an argumentation framework with 4 arguments. E ai is assumed to be a singleton {e i }. Right: abstract lattice L 2 . α(a i ) is assumed to be f (e i ).
1 ≤ i ≤ 4, is a singleton {e i }. The abstract lattice L 2 is shown in Figure G . See to it that the attack of a 1 on a 4 is not of absolute-concrete (concrete-absolute). Now, with (the best) abstraction of a 1 , a 2 and a 3 , we obtain a 5 with E a5 = {e 5 }. While, in general, there is no continuity between some argument a 1 attacking some argument a 4 and some abstraction a x of a 1 attacking a 4 , an exception is taken when there exists some pivotal point in L 2 that strongly distinguishes α(E ax ) and α(E a4 ) = f (e 4 ) (which, by the definition of abstraction, means a 1 and a 4 are equally distinguished), a x to one group, and a 4 to another distinct group. In such a case, as the attack of a 1 on a 4 can be viewed as the attack of the group that a 1 belongs to on the group that a 4 belongs to, and as a 1 and a x belong to the same group, abstraction of a 1 into a x does not modify the attack. This strong distinction holds just when α(E ax ) and α(E a4 ) are not comparable in . This justifies retention of the attack by a 5 on a 4 (the pivot is f (e 6 )) in the abstract space argumentation framework.
We say that abstraction a x of a set A 1 of arguments is conservative iff it is valid, non-trivial, compatible, and attackpreserving.
Theorem 1 For a given
b is conservative, then each abstraction a y of A 1 such that a x is an abstraction of a y is conservative. Proof Suffice it to check the four conditions one by one.
Computation of abstract space argumentation frameworks from a concrete space argumentation framework Algorithm 1 Computation of the set of abstract space argumentation frameworks for a given concrete space argumentation framework Require: X is an argumentation framework, X.addSet(Y ) adds the elements of Y into X, but is assumed to discard duplicates.
1: function DERIVEABS(X) 2: Σ ← an empty set. 3:
abs.space.arg.framwrks to be added to Σ 4:
Σ.addSet(X) Initially only X is in Σ 5:
Γ ← all distinct sets of arguments in X that are strongly connected. 6:
for all A in Γ do 7:
Σ1 ← Σ Copy Σ 8:
Σ ← an empty set. Reset 9:
Π ← the set of all maximal subsets of A that satisfy conservative abstraction. 10:
while Σ1 is not empty do 11:
while Π is not empty do 12:
X1 ← the 1st element of Σ1 13:
A1 ← the 1st element of Π 14:
ax ← the best abstraction of A1 15:
Replace A1 in X1 with ax, while preserving attacks.
16:
Σ.addSet(X1) 17:
Remove the 1st element of Π 18: end while 19:
Remove the 1st element of Σ1 20: end while 21:
end for 22:
return Σ 23: end function All abstract space argumentation frameworks with conservative and best abstraction can be computed for a given argumentation framework, E, f , L 2 and M ⊆ L 2 with Algorithm 1 which, informally, just keeps replacing, where possible at all, a part of, or an entire, cycle with an abstract argument for all possibilities. Concerning Line 9, for a set of arguments A 1 in a given argumentation framework, we say that A 2 ⊆ A 1 is a maximal subset of A 1 that satisfies conservative abstraction iff (1) the best abstraction of A 2 is conservative and (2) there exists no A 3 that satisfy both (2A): A 2 ⊂ A 3 ⊂ A 1 and (2B): the best abstraction of A 3 is conservative.
Proposition 6 (Complexity) Algorithm 1 runs at worst in exponential time.
Proof. Strongly connected components are known to be computable in linear time (Line 5). Line 9 is computable at worst in exponential time. With n argument-lets (with possibly less than n arguments), we can over-estimate that the for loop executes at most n times, the 1st while loop at most ( n C n/2 ) n times, and the 2nd while loop at most n C n/2 times.
Preferred sets in concrete and abstract spaces
We now subject preferred sets in concrete space to those in abstract space for more clues on arguments acceptability in concrete space. Let us denote Algorithm 1 by g α , and a function with [inputs = a set of argumentation frameworks] and [output = a set of all preferred sets for each given argumentation framework] by g p (the procedure can be found in the literature). Further, let g γ be a projection function with [inputs = a set of sets of sets of arguments (i.e. all preferred sets for each argumentation framework)] and [outputs = a set of sets of sets of arguments], with the following description. Let σ be a function with [inputs = a set of sets of arguments × arguments] and [outputs = a set of sets of arguments] such that σ(X, A) = g p ({AF c }) for an argumentation framework AF c in concrete space, which gives us all preferred sets of AF c , and on the other hand g
, which also gives us a set of all preferred sets in concrete space but through abstraction. The abstract transformations proceed by transforming the given concrete space argumentation framework into a set of abstract space argumentation frameworks (g α ({AF c })), deriving preferred sets for them (g p • g α ({AF c })), and projecting them to concrete space preferred sets (g
so that comparisons to the preferred sets obtained directly within concrete space can be done. In particular, we can learn: (1) an argument deemed credulously/skeptically acceptable within concrete space is positively approved by abstract space preferred sets, thus we gain more confidence in the set members being acceptable; (2) arguments not deemed acceptable within concrete space, i.e. those that are not in any preferred set, are negatively approved also by abstract space preferred sets, thus we gain more confidence in those arguments not acceptable. But also: (3) arguments deemed credulously/skeptically acceptable within concrete space may be questioned when their acceptability is not inferred from any abstract space preferred set; and, on the other hand, (4) arguments deemed not acceptable within concrete space may be credulously/skeptically implied by abstract space preferred set(s). To summarise formally, given an argumentation framework AF : (A b , R b ), we say that an argument that is deemed credulously/skeptically acceptable in concrete space is:
, it belongs to some/every element A of X.
questioned iff, for every element X of g
, it belongs to no element A of X.
And we say that an argument that is deemed not acceptable in concrete space is:
credulously/skeptically implied iff, for some/every ele-
, it belongs to some/all member(s) A of X.
Comparisons to Dung preferred semantics and cf2 semantics, and observations
We conclude this section with comparisons to Dung preferred semantics and cf2 semantics (Baroni, Giacomin, and Guida 2005) . Let us first consider AF 1 in Figure A and the lattices as shown in Figure D . Let us denote g
AF , then we have: ∅ for g p (AF 1 ) (i.e. Dung preferred set); {{a 1 , a 5 }, {a 2 , a 5 }, {a 3 , a 5 }} for cf2(AF 1 ); while {a 5 } for G AF1 (AF 1 ) (as we have already shown the only one abstract space argumentation framework, in Figure B , we omit the derivation process). By comparisons between g p (AF 1 ) and G AF1 (AF 1 ), we observe that all a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 areapproved, while a 5 is implied. Hence in this case, with respect to the semantic structure of L 2 , we might say that Dung preferred set behaves more conservative than necessary. On the other hand, by comparisons between cf2(AF 1 ) and G AF1 (AF 1 ), we observe that cf2(AF 1 ) accepts either of the arguments in the odd cycle, which is more liberal than necessary with respect to L 2 -since no arguments in AF 1 could break the preference pre-order focusOnOs < focusOnMp < focusOnEc < focusOnOs of the three arguments. Therefore, for AF 1 , Dung semantics seems to give false-negative to a 5 acceptability, while cf2 seems to give false-positives to either of a 1 , a 2 , a 3 acceptability. If those acceptability semantics aim to answer "Which arguments should be (credulously) accepted?", false-negatives only signal omission, but false-positives signal unintuitive results and are less desirable.
Let us, however, consider another argumentation framework AF 3 in Figure I borrowed from (Baroni, Giacomin, and Guida 2005) . Consider: a 1 The downpour has been relentless since the morning. a 2 It was burning hot today. a 3 All our employees ran a pleasant full marathon today. a 4 Nobody stayed indoor. a 5 Many enjoyed TV shows at home. a4 a5 a4 a1 a5 a3
. . . We assume the abstract lattice as shown in Figure I for AF 3 . We assume M = L 2 , and any nodes below f (Fm), f (TV), f (Dp), f (Bn) not explicitly shown there are still assumed to be there. W, A, M, H, Id, Fm, Dp, Br each abbreviates Weather, Activity, Mild, Hard, Indoor, Full-marathon, Downpour and Burning. The lattice expresses in particular that a downpour and the burning sun relate under the hard weather, and the hard weather and indoor activities such as watching TV shows relate under hard weather activity (that is, an activity to do under a hard weather condition), but that hard weather and mild weather activities do not go together. Also, indoor and no-indoor oppose. Here we have: {{a 5 }} for g p (AF 3 ); {{a 1 , a 4 }, {a 1 , a 5 }, {a 2 , a 5 }, {a 3 , a 4 }, {a 3 , a 5 }} for cf2(AF 3 ). Meanwhile, for G AF3 (AF 3 ), {a 1 , a 2 } is first of all the set of a maximal subset of {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. It is attackpreserving: α({DP, Br}) = f (HW), which is not comparable with f (NoId) or f (Fm), valid because f (HW) does not abstract Fm, non-trivial, and compatible. Hence the argumentation framework shown under AF 3 in Figure I is the abstract space argumentation framework with respect to L 2 . Consequently, G AF3 (AF 3 ) = {{a 3 , a 4 }, {a 3 , a 5 }, {a 5 }}. Therefore, in this example, G AF3 (AF 3 ), too, credulously accepts an argument in the odd-cycle as cf2(AF 3 ) does. Notice, however, that we still obtain the Dung conservative preferred set {a 5 } which obtains from {a y , a 5 }.
It is safe to observe that the traditional Dung, or cf2, which is more appropriate depends not just on an argument graph but also the semantic relation among the arguments in the graph; and that combination of abstract argumentation and abstract interpretation is one viable methodology to address this problem around cycles in argumentation frameworks.
Related work
As far as we are aware, this is the first study that incorporates abstract interpretation into abstract argumentation theory. Odd-sized cycles have been a popular topic of research in the literature for some time, as they tend to prevent the acceptability of all subsequent arguments with respect to directionality. Noting the difference between preferred and the grounded semantics, Baroni et al. (Baroni, Giacomin, and Guida 2005) proposed to accept maximal conflict-free subsets of a cycle for gaining more acceptable arguments off an odd-length cycle, which led to cf1/cf2 semantics. They are regarded as improvements on more traditional naive semantics (Bondarenko et al. 1997) . They also weaken Dung defence around strongly connected components of an argumentation framework into SCC-recursiveness.
The stage2 semantics that took inspiration from cf2 is another approach with a similar SCC-recursive aspect, but which is based on the stage semantics (Verheij 1996) rather than the naive semantics, the incentive being to maximise range (the range of a set of arguments is itself plus all arguments it attacks).
The fundamental motivation behind those semantics was to treat an odd-length cycle in a similar manner to an evenlength cycle. As we showed, however, specialisation of Dung semantics without regard to semantic relation among arguments in a given argumentation framework seems not fully generalisable. To an extent, that any such systematic resolution of acceptability of cyclic arguments based only on a Dung argumentation graph is tricky relates to the fact that attacking arguments in a cycle can be contrarily (Horn 2001) but not necessarily contradictorily opposing. As the study in (Baroni, Giacomin, and Liao 2015) shows and as is known in linguistics, dealing with contrary relations is difficult in Fregean logic. However, with abstract interpretation, we can take advantage of semantic information of arguments in partitioning those attacking arguments in a cycle into mutually incompatible subsets, by which uniform treatment of cycles come into reach.
Conclusion
We introduced abstract interpretation into argumentation frameworks. Our formulation shows it is also a powerful methodology in AI reasoning. We believe that more and more attention will be directed towards semanticargumentgraph hybrid studies within argumentation community, and we hope that our work will provide one fruitful research direction.
